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9.1  Introduction 
Does wealth typically decline after retirement‘? Despite much recent 
research, this deceptively simple question has remained controversial. 
Previous investigators seem evenly divided on the issue of whether 
elderly individuals save or dissave, and no consensus about magnitudes 
has emerged even among those who agree on the direction of change. 
There is as well widespread disagreement about the reasons for ask- 
ing this question. Some (notably Mirer 1979) have argued that the life 
cycle hypothesis is inconsistent with rising or slowly declining wealth 
after retirement. Others (such as Davies 1981) have recognized that, in 
view of  uncertainty concerning life spans, one cannot base a formal 
test of the life cycle hypothesis on this information alone. Such authors 
have, however, suggested that one could conduct an informal “test” 
by comparing empirical data with the results of simulations based upon 
plausible parameters values. Finally, one might altogether abandon the 
hope of inferring motives from information about the age-wealth profile, 
and instead simply treat such information as valuable per se. If, for 
example, wealth fails to decline rapidly after retirement, intergenera- 
tional transfers are likely to be significant. Regardless of motives, this 
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will have strong implications concerning the long run distribution of 
wealth (see, e.g., Stiglitz 1978; Loury 1981). 
The appropriate definition of “wealth”  will depend critically upon 
which of these purposes one has in mind. Information on bequeathable 
wealth-age profiles is by itself sufficient for drawing inferences about 
the magnitude of bequests. However, tests of the life cycle hypothesis 
must necessarily consider all forms of  resources, including annuities 
(social security and pensions). It is therefore somewhat surprising that, 
with few exceptions  (King and Dicks-Mireaux  1982, Dicks-Mireaux 
and King 1984; Hurd and Shoven 1985),  studies of the age-wealth profile 
ignore annuities. Nor have any of these authors provided a theoretical 
discussion of how calculated rates of dissaving should be adjusted in 
the presence of annuities. 
Accordingly, this paper has three objectives. First, we present new 
evidence on  the relationship  between  age and  bequeathable  wealth 
holdings after retirement. While previous studies employ either cross- 
sectional survey or estate data, our approach is to follow a sample of 
retired individuals over time. We  argue that this methodology is likely 
to produce  superior estimates of  dissaving after retirement.  We  find 
that bequeathable wealth declines relatively rapidly for single individ- 
uals (roughly 3%-4%  per year), while for couples, the evidence is mixed 
(slight declines, on the order of  1  %-2%  per year, are observed for early 
retirees; otherwise, bequeathable wealth remains relatively  constant 
after retirement). Changes in the composition of bequeathable wealth 
(specifically, the fraction held as residential housing) are also analyzed. 
Our second objective is to develop and implement a technique for 
calculating meaningful rates of resource depletion when some positive 
fraction of wealth is held as annuities. Since survival probabilities de- 
cline with age, the use of actuarial values (as in King and Dicks-Mireaux 
1982 or Dicks-Mireaux and King  1984) builds in a tendency for total 
wealth to decline quite rapidly after retirement.  However, we argue 
that actuarial discounting is inappropriate for calculating meaningful 
rates of depletion. Instead, we show that simple discounting of benefit 
streams is (approximately) appropriate whenever behavior is governed 
by traditional life cycle concerns. Thus we find, contrary to King and 
Dicks-Mireaux, that, after adjusting for annuities, neither single indi- 
viduals nor couples dissave significant fractions of their total resources 
after retirement. 
Of  course, this is not a formal test of the life cycle maximization 
principle.  Our third objective is to construct such a test using infor- 
mation on the age-wealth profile. We  show that the life cycle model 
has strong implications about how rates of accumulation and depletion 
will respond to the imposition of nondiscretionary annuities.  Imple- 
mentation of these tests produces results which are unfavorable to the 
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe 
the data source which is employed throughout.  A discussion of the 
existing literature on bequeathable wealth-age profiles appears in sec- 
tion 9.3, along with our new estimates. Theoretical foundations for the 
valuation of annuity wealth are discussed in section 9.4, and adjusted 
estimates of  accumulation  and depletion are presented.  Section 9.5 
describes and implements a test of the life cycle hypothesis based on 
the behavioral response of  changes in wealth to involuntary annuiti- 
zation. The paper closes with a brief conclusion. 
9.2  The Data 
This study employs data from the Longitudinal Retirement History 
Survey (LRHS), which followed a sample of  over 11,000 retirement- 
aged individuals (58-63  in  1968) for a period of  10 years, starting in 
1969. Some information was also obtained from matching administra- 
tive records. 
The LRHS collected extensive information on the net worth of re- 
spondents. Our measure of bequeathable wealth includes the value of 
owner-occupied housing (net of mortgage liabilities), equity in a busi- 
ness or farm, the net value of other property holdings, cash, and fi- 
nancial assets (including stocks, bonds, bank accounts, checking ac- 
counts,  and  money  loaned  to  other),  minus  total  household  debt 
(excluding mortgage items already counted).2 
While extensive in coverage, there is reason to believe that wealth 
data contained in the LRHS are not of  high quality. In general, it is 
difficult to elicit accurate information  about net  worth  in  interview 
 survey^.^  A casual inspection of LRHS records indicates substantial 
misreporting of assets  .4 Deleting observations for which any compo- 
nent of  wealth was incorrectly reported would drastically reduce the 
sample size, as well as induce a bias of unknown direction. Due to the 
relative magnitude of housing in the portfolios of most elderly individ- 
uals, we did insist that the completion code associated with this item 
indicated  an unambiguous  value.  This  probably  biases  our sample 
somewhat toward  renter^,^ although the statistics presented in section 
9.3 suggest that this bias is not large. Throughout the paper, it is im- 
portant to bear in mind that wealth is poorly reported; we will return 
to this issue at various points. 
Our study also requires extensive information on pensions and an- 
nuities.  Private and government pension  benefits  are inferred from 
income data reported during the sample period. Fortunately, it is pos- 
sible to distinguish one-shot, lump sum payments from annuities on 
the basis of recorded responses. For individuals retiring late, benefits 
from such pensions may commence after 1979 (the youngest respondent 
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individuals, we supplement income data with survey responses to ques- 
tions concerning expected levels of future benefits. However, one should 
bear in mind that private pensions in particular are probably underre- 
ported for late retirees. 
Social security benefits for each year were calculated on the basis 
of  prevailing legislation in that year, using data on covered earnings 
obtained through matching administrative records. Benefits were cal- 
culated on the  basis  of  actual retirement  dates for respondent  and 
spouse. For the purpose of this calculation, we assumed that all indi- 
viduals still working in 1979 retired at the end of that year. 
The matching administrative records were also used to calculate a 
measure of lifetime resources for each respondent. Unfortunately, this 
information is incomplete, since yearly earnings are only reported up 
to the taxable maximum. Since the records also indicate the quarter in 
which the taxable maximum was reached, we were able to extrapolate 
yearly earnings using the method described by Fox (1976). The resulting 
income stream was then accumulated at a 3% rate to a standard age, 
producing a measure of lifetime earnings. 
Much of our analysis also requires us to know whether a particular 
individual is retired. Defining retirement is problematic. To reduce con- 
tamination arising from the presence of  earned income, we created a 
relatively  pristine  sample of  retirees.  Thus, “retirees”  report  them- 
selves as fully retired  in both the retirement year and all successive 
years, and they report negligible earned income during this period.6 A 
retired couple consists of two retired members, while a working couple 
need only have one worker. 
In the following sections, our analysis focuses on the behavior of 
four samples. To  minimize the effects of  short-run fluctuations, it seemed 
desirable to look at changes in  wealth  over relatively  long periods. 
Since the 1973 wave of the LRHS collected very incomplete data on 
asset holdings, we chose to compare the behavior of retirees and work- 
ers over the periods  1969-75  and  1975-79.  For the first period, we 
constructed a sample of households who were retired as of 1969, and 
deleted all observations which had disappeared by 1975 (due to death 
or attrition) or for which household composition had changed (due to 
divorce, separation, or death). Similarly, we constructed a sample of 
households which still included working members as of  1975 and used 
these as a basis of comparison.’  Note that our households are prese- 
lected on the basis of survival, and presumably overrepresent healthy 
individuals. This probably biases our estimate of asset decumulation 
downward a bit relative to the correct number for the entire population, 
but it should not affect the comparison of workers and retirees. The 
second period (1975-79)  received identical treatment. Our basic sam- 
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504 couples), 1,360 households still working in  1975 (240 single indi- 
viduals,  1,120 couples), 1,037 households retired by  1975 (173 single 
individuals, 864 couples), and 507 households still working in  1979 (96 
singles, 41 1 couples). 
Finally, all  variables  have been  deflated to 1975 dollars. This, of 
course, affects the interpretation of magnitudes reported in the follow- 
ing sections. 
9.3  Bequeathable Wealth 
Although information about the bequeathable wealth-age profile does 
not by itself allow us to discuss the plausibility of  life cycle motives, 
it  is nevertheless of  significant independent interest. In this  section, 
we review the existing literature on dissaving among the elderly, arguing 
that previous studies suffer from significant biases. New estimates of 
dissaving from bequeathable wealth are then presented. 
9.3.1  Previous Studies 
Three different types of data sources have been used to estimate the 
extent of  dissaving during retirement. These are: (1) interview surveys 
of  saving among the aged, (2) cross-section interview surveys of  net 
worth, and (3) estate data. We  consider these in turn. 
Typically, data from interview surveys of  saving among the aged 
(Lydall 1955; Projector 1968; Mulanaphy 1974) have found positive or 
only  slightly negative  rates  of  accumulation. These findings can be 
criticized on several grounds. First, savings are defined by observable 
transactions. Thus, all capital gains and losses (including those induced 
by inflation) are omitted. Second, the data are highly aggregated. Both 
Projector and Lydall group all aged individuals (those over 65) together 
in  a single category.  Undoubtedly,  many  of  these are still working, 
perhaps saving at a rapid rate in anticipation of retirement. This problem 
is  compounded by  the fact  that mean  values  are reported-a  small 
(perhaps wealthy) fraction of the sample saving large amounts may, in 
such a calculation, dominate the dissaving of  a much larger fraction. 
Thus, the percentage of  retirees  dissaving at reasonably  rapid rates 
may be much larger than these numbers would suggest. 
A  number  of  investigators, including Lydall (1953, Projector and 
Weiss (1966), Smith (1975), Mirer (1979), and King and Dicks-Mireaux 
(1982)  have attempted to infer the bequeathable wealth-age profile from 
cross-section interview  surveys of  net worth.  With the exception of 
King and Dicks-Mireaux, these studies confirm the findings reported 
above. However, this approach encounters a variety of difficulties. 
First, none of these studies distinguish between workers and retirees. 
Physical  assets understate  the total  wealth  (human and nonhuman) 242  B. Douglas Bernheim 
available to nonretired individuals. Since the proportion of fully retired 
individuals in  a cohort rises with the age of that cohort, this builds in 
a spurious positive correlation between observed wealth and age.* 
To  illustrate the potential significance of this effect, we regressed 
total bequeathable wealth on age and lifetime resources for four sub- 
samples (all single individuals, retired single individuals, all couples, 
and retired couples), using cross-section data from the 1975 wave of 
the LRHS. We  chose the 1975 wave for two reasons: (1) in 1975, age 
of respondent ranges from 64 to 69, which facilitates comparison with 
other st~dies,~  and (2) in  1969, there was very little spread in age of 
retirement due to the comparative youth of the sample.'O Our results 
are presented in table 9.1."  Point estimates for the entire sample are 
roughly consistent with previous studies. However, when current work- 
ers are excluded, significant dissaving is observed for both single in- 
dividuals and couples (note, however, that the coefficient is not statis- 
tically significant for couples). 
Unfortunately, restricting attention to retired  individuals within a 
cross-section induces a sample selection bias. Suppose we know that 
an individual of age A is retired, but we have not observed his date of 
retirement. It is straightforward to show that his expected age of re- 
tirement is increasing in A.12 Thus, all else equal, we would expect 
older members of a cross-section to have retired later. Differences in 
age therefore overstate differences in years of retirement (time spent 
dissaving). This suggests that our estimates understate the true mag- 
nitude of dissaving. 
A second difficulty encountered by studies employing cross-section 
interview surveys of net worth is that such surveys implicitly incor- 
porate an important sample selection criterion: only surviving members 
of a particular cohort are represented. Ex ante, survivors are, on a 
average, healthier. Thus, as a cohort ages, the survivors will represent 
an increasingly  healthy  (in a lifetime sense) fraction of  the original 
Table 9.1  Wealth Level Regressions for 1975 Cross-Section 
Singles  Couples 
Variable  All  Retired  All  Retired 
Constant  -  10934  168757  34527  170171 
(36359)  (83408)  (37321)  (I  18587) 
(593)  (1354)  (608.9)  (1930) 
Age  379  -  2442  65.6  -  1925 
Y  0.0234  0.00892  0.0133  0.0196 
(0.0054)  (0.0134)  (0.0035)  (0.01  02) 
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sample.  l3 This induces a correlation between age and lifetime health 
in cross-sections.  l4  Healthier individuals in turn tend to accumulate 
more wealth to provide for longer retirement periods. As a result, a 
spurious positive correlation between wealth and age may be observed. 
Third, with the exception of King and Dicks-Mireaux, studies em- 
ploying cross-section surveys of net worth fail to control for lifetime 
resources.  Since wealthier people tend to live longer, older members 
of any cross-section will, on average, have higher lifetime resources. 
This problem is compounded by the secular decline in retirement age 
(older individuals spent more years in the labor force). Rising produc- 
tivity generates an offsetting “cohort effect”-on average, older mem- 
bers of  any cross-section will have worked during periods of  lower 
wages. The net effect is ambiguous; age may be positively or negatively 
correlated with age in cross-sections.  l5 
King and Dicks-Mireaux recognize the importance of controlling for 
lifetime earnings, and employ the ratio of net worth to “permanent 
income”  as their dependent variable.  While this is an improvement 
over previous techniques, it fails to correct properly for the first two 
sources of bias mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Most obviously, 
since permanent income is a yearly figure, no adjustment is made for 
length of  working life. In addition, this variable is constructed in a 
manner which fails to adjust for the correlation between wealth and 
survival probabilities. Specifically, permanent income is inferred from 
a cross-section regression explaining current earnings. Since retired 
individuals have no current earnings, the estimates are driven by the 
earnings of younger (and therefore, since the cohort effect is corrected 
for, lifetime poorer) individuals. This builds in a tendency to under- 
predict the permanent income of elderly individuals, or equivalently 
to understate the extent of dissaving. 
Finally, we consider studies based on estate data. Since Atkinson 
(1971), Atkinson and Harrison (1978), and Brittain (1978) use this data 
to generate cross-section estimates of the age-wealth relation,  their 
analyses suffer from the problems described above. In fact, different 
sample selection criteria imply that, in some cases, the bias will be 
much worse.  For example, information on young individuals is ob- 
served only if those individuals die young. Since early death is highly 
correlated with poor health, there will be a strong correlation between 
age and lifetime health in such samples. In addition, estate data are 
heavily truncated, providing no information on a very large number of 
individuals who die with relatively little net worth. In effect, any in- 
dividual who dissaves too rapidly is automatically excluded from these 
samples. 
Shorrocks (1975) used a somewhat different approach, estimating the 
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over time. While he corrects for potential biases based upon the cor- 
relation between wealth and survival probabilities, he does not adjust 
for the effects of attrition (individuals who dissave sufficiently never 
show up in estate data), and therefore understates the rate of resource 
depletion. 
While most of these studies have focused on the relationship between 
total bequeathable wealth and age, some have also investigated changes 
in portfolio composition among the elderly. One question of particular 
interest is how the percentage of  net worth held as owner-occupied 
housing changes with age. Attempts to infer an answer to this question 
based upon cross-section data are subject to the difficulties mentioned 
above.  Portfolio composition  may,  for example, be  related  to total 
lifetime resources, which is correlated with age in cross-sections (see 
above). It is therefore not surprising that various studies, such as  Mirer 
and King and Dicks-Mireaux, have reached very different conclusions.  Ih 
9.3.2  New Estimates 
Since most objections to analyses of cross-section data are based on 
the premise that individuals at one age are systematically different from 
individuals at another age, one possible solution is to follow the same 
individuals over time, observing changes in their net worth. Thus, Mirer 
concludes that longitudinal data from retirement to death would  be 
“ideal” for determining wealth holding profiles.  l7 Diamond and Haus- 
man (1984) have previously employed the National Longitudinal Survey 
(NLS, or Parnes data) to  study individual savings behavior,  in  part 
generating an estimate of asset decumulation after retirement. Like the 
LRHS, the NLS followed a sample of households over a period of 10 
years; however, NLS respondents are, on average, much younger. 
Thus, Diamond and Hausman’s estimates of decumulation  are based 
on a relatively small,19  and perhaps atypical,?O sample of retirees. With 
the completion  and availability  of  the LRHS, it  is  now  possible  to 
supplement the existing literature with new estimates based on more 
complete longitudinal  data for the early retirement period.  Our first 
objective is to provide this evidence. 
While the use of panel data does allow us to overcome a variety of 
difficulties encountered by other approaches. it also raises a new set 
of  problems. First, estimates are very sensitive  to  macroeconomic 
events. For example, in a period of supra (sub) normal stock market 
returns, respondents may experience significant unanticipated accu- 
mulation (depletion) of net worth (more on this below). The data, how- 
ever, provide no way of distinguishing motives. It is worth noting that 
analyses of cross-section data encounter a similar difficulty, since dif- 
ferent cohorts have encountered systematically  different patterns of 
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context, we can partially correct for this e€fect by examining evidence 
based upon macroeconomically distinct time periods (specifically, we 
use  1969 through  1975 and 1975 through  1979). In addition, we can, 
for each period, isolate the net effect of  retirement on accumulation 
by contrasting the behavior of retirees and workers. 
A second problem concerns sample selection. For each period, our 
analysis is confined to households who “survived”  the entire period. 
Presumably this implies that our data overrepresent healthy, wealthy, 
and domestically stable households. In addition, our requirement that 
households be retired at the beginning of the period, combined with 
the relative youth of respondents, implies that the sample is skewed 
toward early retirees.21  It is critical to realize, however, that although 
our sample may be  somewhat atypical relative to the entire popula- 
tion,22 there is no reason  to believe  that our  selection criteria bias 
estimates of dissaving for this group. The great advantage of panel data 
is  that,  by  following the  same households over time,  we  can  hold 
exogenous factors (however selected) constant. In contrast, for cross- 
sections,  dissaving is inferred  from differences  in  the net  worth  of 
households of different ages, who are implicitly selected according to 
different criteria. We  conclude that panel data, while not perfect, pro- 
vides a superior source of evidence on asset accumulation. 
We  begin by inspecting the time pattern of mean bequeathable wealth 
for each of our subgroups. Results are presented in table 9.2.23  Between 
1969 and 1975, net worth declines by 21.1% ($3,176) for retired indi- 
viduals, and 22.8%  ($7,923) for retired  couples.  In  the later period 
(1975-79), it declines by 6.8% ($1,393) for retired individuals and rises 
by 4.1% ($2,466)  for retired couples. These figures are consistent with 
a 3%-4%  yearly decline during the first period and either a 2% yearly 
decline or 1% yearly rise in the second period. It is difficult to determine 
whether differences between periods are attributable to sample differ- 
ences (early vs. late retirees) or to changing macroeconomic circum- 
stances. 
It is noteworthy that, for each subgroup of working households, net 
worth  always moves in  the  same direction as it does for the corre- 
sponding retired  subgroup. In fact, it falls for all groups, except for 
couples between 1975 and 1979. This in itself is not surprising; hump- 
shaped income profiles may cause wealth to begin its decline prior to 
retirement.  King and Dicks-Mireaux also find  some evidence of dis- 
saving within the pre-retirement group. However, since income falls 
discontinuously  at retirement,  the life cycle hypothesis at  minimum 
predicts that the rate of  accumulation (depletion) should fall (rise) at 
that time.z4 Is this prediction consistent with the data? 
For single individuals, there is very little difference in either period 
between  the absolute dollar value dissaved by retirees and workers. Table 9.2  Bequeathable Wealth by Year and Retirement Status 
Single Individuals  Couples 
Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired 
Variable  1969  by 1975  1975  by 1979  1969  by  1975  1975  by 1979 
Bequeathable 
wealth in 
1969  15008  30003  2 1743  48768  348 18  667 1  9  61304  87374 
1975  11832  27183  20601  37943  26895  64420  60144  75709 
19209  37071  -  -  62610  x44x0  1979  -  - 
Fraction of sample with 
positive bequeathable 
wealth in 
1969  0.685  0.858  0.821  0.896  0.915  0.938  0.957  0.949 
1975  0.626  0.846  0.902  0.885  0.768  0.932  0.962  0.961 
1979  -  -  0.879  0.885  -  -  0.954  0.95 I 
1969 and  1975  0.415  0.675  0.671  0.719  0.621  0.818  0.855  0.827 
-  0.688  0.750  -  -  0.861  0.844  1975 and 1979  - 
Sample size  270  240  173  96  504  1120  864  41 1 247  Dissaving after Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis 
~  ~ 
However, since early retirees tend to be relatively poor, differences 
between rates of dissaving are substantial (mean net worth of workers 
fell 9.4% between  1969 and  1975 and 2.3% between  1975 and  1979). 
For couples, differences between both rates of change and absolute 
dollar values dissaved were substantiaLz5  In interpreting these num- 
bers, it is important to recall that the subgroups are based on different 
sample selection criteria, and differences may therefore reflect heter- 
ogeneous behavioral propensities. 
One puzzling aspect of table 9.2 is the precipitous decline between 
1969 and 1975 in the net worth of both single individuals and couples 
still working in 1979. During this period, mean dissaving of households 
retiring in the more distant future exceeded that of any other groups. 
This observation seems inconsistent with life cycle behavior; we will 
return to it at various point. 
For a number of  reasons, we are dissatisfied with estimates of ac- 
cumulation and depletion based on mean values of  net worth. Most 
importantly, these estimates will be heavily influenced by the potentially 
atypical behavior of  households with high initial wealth. Suppose, for 
example, that the behavior of households i is given byz6 
Wt,i = Pi Wr-1,  13 
where Wt,i is bequeathable wealth in 
mean population dissaving rate, is 
period t. Our estimate fil, of  the 
That is, & is a weighted average of the pi's, where the largest weights 
are accorded to individuals with high initial wealth. Such individuals 
may, for example, be atypically acquisitive, leading to a high estimated 
value of  p. 
A related problem concerns measurement error. Suppose that pi has 
a common value, p, for all households, so that true wealth K,j  evolves 
according to 
(2)  K,i = PK-,.i . 
Assume as well that wealth is observed with error: 
(3)  W  ?.I  . =  %.i  cr,;, 
where E(E,,~)  = 1, and E',~  is independent of  Wyi and E,~  for all (7,  j)  # 
(r, i).  Then our estimate p1  can be written as 248  B. Douglas Bernheim 
where 
Pz = P Er.ilEt-1.i  . 
& is a consistent estimator of p. However, since it is a ratio of stochastic 
terms, its small  sample properties are suspect. In particular,  obser- 
vations with a high value of  E~-~,~  (and therefore a lower value of 6.) 
will receive greater weight (  Wf_  l,)Nwr-  I.i  will be higher). We  would 
therefore expect our estimate of p to be biased downwards, toward 
high dissaving. 
These considerations suggest that we should accord equal weight to 
the dissaving rule of each household.  One alternative is to calculate 
the mean rate, P2: 
(where N  is the number of  observations). When wealth is observed 
with error, this technique will produce inconsistent estimates of p. In 
particular,  it is straightforward  to verify  that, under the appropriate 
regularity conditions ,27 
which  generally exceeds p. The difficulty again  arises from the ap- 
pearance of a stochastic term in the denominator. 
We  suggest the following procedure. Equation (2) can be written as 
log K,j/iv-l,,  = log p. 
Substituting (3), we see that 
log Wt,i/Wt-l,j  = log P + log ~i-1,; - log Er,j . 
If the measurement error terms are, for example, independent2* and 
lognormal,  then the  mean  observed log  rate of  accumulation is  an 
unbiased estimator of  the log of P. With population heterogeneity, this 
procedure produces an unbiased estimate of the mean of log pi, but it 
is not possible to recover the population mean of pi itself. However, 
if  the Pj’s are reasonably close together (we might expect them to be 
near unity), the mean of the logs will not be far from the log of the 
mean. 
The problem  with  the procedure is that it requires us to drop all 
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t or period t - 1. It is important to examine the resulting sample se- 
lection bias. If the sample is heterogeneous, the procedure excludes 
all observations for whom  pi  = 0 or m. In addition, if  the probability 
of falsely reporting 0 falls with wealth, then our estimate of the mean 
of log pi  will be biased 
To  determine the potential significance of this effect, we examined 
the frequency of  movements to and from nonpositive levels of  be- 
queathable wealth. Our findings are summarized in the second part of 
table  9.2. For  most  groups  (especially couples), the percentage re- 
porting zero wealth was relatively low. Moreover, net movements be- 
tween positive and nonpositive wealth levels are typically quite small 
(on the order of  1% or 2%), with three exceptions. First, 6% (net) of 
retired single individuals moved from positive to nonpositive  wealth 
between 1969 and 1975, as did 15% of retired couples. During the same 
period, 8%  of single individuals who would retire by  1975 moved in 
the opposite direction. Thus, we observe some tendency for early re- 
tirees to completely exhaust their accumulated resources quickly after 
retirement. We  also observe a significant fraction of single individuals 
accumulating  appreciable  resources  only  immediately  prior  to 
retirement. 
There is, however, much noise in these data. While net movements 
between positive and nonpositive wealth levels are typically small, the 
total fraction of  households moving in  one direction or the other is 
quite large. To see this, note (in table 9.2) that the percentage of house- 
holds reporting positive resources in two consecutive sample years is 
substantially smaller than the fraction reporting positive resources in 
either of those two years alone. 
Table 9.3 presents sample statistics on log W,,/W,,  and log W,,/W,, 
for each of our subgroups. Recognizing the conceptual difficulties gen- 
erated by  the sample selection bias described above, we have listed 
medians, as  well  as  the  fraction of  each  subsample for  which  be- 
queathable wealth declines during the period of observation. If  inclu- 
sion of observations with zero wealth is desired, it is possible to adjust 
fractile  statistics using the percentage movements to and from zero 
wealth reported in table 9.2. 
The results are quite striking, and differ enormously from those based 
on wealth levels. The mean log rates of accumulation indicate statis- 
tically significant dissaving for every retired group, except couples from 
1975 to 1979. Positive saving among this group may be an artifact of 
the precipitous, and probably unanticipated, rise in housing prices dur- 
ing the late seventies, combined with relatively widespread home own- 
ership (see statistics below). In contrast, no dissaving is indicated in 
any currently working group, and in many such cases the estimated 
saving rates are statistically significant. Note that the “puzzle” of sig- Table 9.3  Changes in Bequeathable Wealth by Year and Retirement Status 
Single Individuals  Couples 
Retired  by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired 
Variable  1969  by 1975  1975  by 1979  1969  by 1975  1975  by 1979 
Log w?SIw69 
Mean*  -0.198  0.113  0.256  0.025  -  0.125  0.171  0.123  0.077 
(0.108)  (0.131)  (0.143)  (0.180)  (0.066)  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.063) 
Median  -0.186  0.152  0.131  0.009  -  0.086  0.181  0.149  0.170 
Fraction < 0  0.580  0.444  0.457  0.507  0.527  0.381  0.407  0.418 
Log W?dW?S 
Mean*  -  -  -0.285  0.021  -  -  0.028  0.095 
(0.120)  (0.164)  (0.044)  (0.055) 
Median  -  -  -0.104  0.176  -  -  0.074  0.133 
Fraction < 0  -  -  0.546  0.375  -  -  0.415  0.403 
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nificant dissaving before retirement among late retirees no longer ap- 
pears. Medians reveal a similar pattern, the only discrepancy in sign 
arising with respect to single individuals still working in  1979, during 
the first sample period. Adjustment of  medians for movement to and 
from nonpositive wealth would not alter this pattern. 
Rates of dissaving for retired single individuals are evidently quite 
high. Calculated means indicated a yearly decline of between 3% and 
6%; medians confirm the lower end of this range. In contrast, couples 
dissave very little-perhaps  1% or 2% per year in the first period (early 
retirees), and not at all in the second period (although medians indicate 
that wealth may have risen  by  as much as 2% per year, the reader 
should bear in mind the above qualification concerning housing price 
inflation). The discrepancy between the behavior of  single individuals 
and that of couples should not be surprising, since couples must provide 
for the possibility  that  either member  survives for a long time.  In 
addition, it may account for the diversity of previous estimates: Mirer 
studies  couples,  while  King  and  Dicks-Mireaux  include  single 
individuals. 
It is worth noting that saving is observed for a significant fraction 
(over 40%) of all retired samples, and that dissaving is observed for a 
significant fraction (over one-third) of  all nonretired  samples. While 
this phenomenon may reflect heterogeneity of behavior, we are inclined 
to attribute it primarily to the apparent extent of measurement error. 
Only our highest estimates of depletion rates are roughly consistent 
with the 5.1% to 7.4% figures obtained by  Diamond and Hausman 
(1984). These  estimates are not, however,  strictly comparable with 
ours, since they refer to hypothetical decumulation in the absence of 
annuity holdings (more on this in sections 9.4 and 9.5). In addition, 
Diamond and Hausman’s sample may be unrepresentative.  As men- 
tioned earlier, NLS households are, on average, substantially younger 
than LRHS households. Individuals retiring during the NLS sample 
period will, by  and large, be early retirees; our results indicate that 
early retirees tend to overrepresent single individ~als,~~  and we have 
seen that single individuals deplete resources more rapidly than cou- 
ples. In light of our findings, it would seem unwise to conclude on the 
basis  of  their  study that typical married  retirees  dissave  significant 
portions of their wealth. 
We  now examine the evolution of portfolio composition after retire- 
ment. Table 9.4 decomposes bequeathable wealth into four categories: 
owner-occupied housing, business and property, financial assets, and 
debt (other than mortgages). The last of these categories is insignificant. 
The  extent  of  home  ownership  (fraction  owner-occupants)  is  also 
indicated. 
For both single individuals and couples retired by  1969, there is a 
decline in  every significant asset category except housing.  The data 252  B. Douglas Bernheim 
Table 9.4  Breakdown of Bequeathable Wealth for Retirees 
Single Individuals  Couples 
Type of  Retired by  Retired by  Retired by  Retired by 





6122  4175  13700  15013 
(0.307)  (0.260)  (0.688)  (0.627) 
6424  9893  13944  2548 1 
(0.322)  (0.468)  (0.581)  (0.791) 
-  8268  -  28934 
(0.416)  (0.775) 
Business and property 
1969  1312  12042  6172  29625 
1975  914  4575  340 I  14013 
1979  -  4143  -  14966 
Financial wealth 
1969  7718  5790  I5654  17635 
1975  4646  6509  101 19  21509 
1979  -  6949  -  I9076 
Nonrnortgage debt 
1969  143  263  709  969 
1975  153  3  74  567  861 
1979  -  192  -  366 
*Percentage owning a home is given in parentheses 
indicate a slight increase in  home ownership for retired  individuals 
during this period and a slight decline for retired couples. 
The behavior  of  households which  were retired by  1975 is more 
interesting.  More or less simultaneously  with retirement (1969-73, 
both single individuals and couples liquidated large amounts of business 
and property wealth.  At the same time, holdings  of financial assets 
rose slightly, while large gains in  housing wealth  (especially in  fre- 
quency of home ownership) were registered. This raises the possibility 
that households liquidated business and property holdings to finance 
purchases of homes.31 During the post-retirement period, there is a 
slight dip in home ownership for both groups. Evidently, while many 
households purchase homes at retirement, a smaller but significant 
number of  households sell homes within  a few years subsequent to 
retirement. 
The evidence also appears to indicate that a reasonably stable (per- 
haps  slightly increasing) fraction  of  bequeathable wealth  is held  as 
owner-occupied  housing during retirement. This confirms the finding 
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should emphasize that  these data only concern the early retirement 
period. 
9.4  Annuities 
A very large fraction of the total resources available to many retired 
individuals is locked into annuities (government and private pensions, 
social  security).  Studies which ignore this important  component  of 
wealth fail to provide sufficient information for judging the plausibility 
of life cycle motives. 
It has frequently been argued that the inclusion of  annuities would 
vindicate the hump-shaped wealth-age profile, since the actuarial value 
of survival contingent claims falls with age (single-year survival prob- 
abilities decline). Thus, Mirer (1979) concedes that, “to some extent, 
perhaps a great  one for many people,  pension  and Social Security 
programs tend to institutionalize the tenets of  the life cycle theory.” 
Likewise, Dicks-Mireaux and King (1984) find  evidence of  “a clear 
life-cycle pattern” when the actuarial value of  annuity claims are in- 
cluded in measures of net worth. 
In this section, I argue that actuarial valuation is inappropriate if one 
wishes to infer an age-wealth profile in order to judge the plausibility 
of life cycle motives. Elsewhere (Bernheim 1984b), I have shown that 
the simple discounted value of future benefits (ignoring the possibility 
of death) is ordinarily a good approximation to the value (in terms of 
compensating variation)  of  an annuity.  Here 1 establish that  simple 
discounting is also appropriate within the current context. Since this 
measure changes very little with age, my analysis reverses the conclu- 
sions of King and Dicks-Mireaux: the inclusion of annuities reinforces 
earlier findings that  resources  decline  only  slightly, if  at all,  after 
retirement. 
9.4.1  Theoretical Considerations 
Actuarial valuation of annuities is appropriate under either of  two 
conditions: (1)  households are risk  neutral,  or (2)  households  have 
access to competitive annuity markets. The first of these conditions is 
unreasonably  restrictive,  and  generates  absurd  behavioral  predic- 
ti0ns.3~  Under the second condition, there is a very simple test of pure 
life cycle motives: Do households hold positive levels of bequeathable 
wealth at all? In fact, if  annuities yield any return  in  excess of the 
interest rate, pure life cycle consumers will annuitize  100% of their 
resources,33 and the notion of  dissaving will be vacuous. Thus, if  we 
wish to use evidence on rates of  dissaving to test the pure life cycle 
hypothesis, we must assume a complete absence of annuity markets.34 254  B. Douglas Bernheim 
Under the assumptions of missing annuity markets and risk aversion, 
the value of an annuity will exceed its actuarial value by a risk premium. 
Our current task is to determine what this observation implies about 
the appropriate computation of age-wealth profiles. 
We  will  assume the constant elasticity,  intertemporally  separable 
form of  lifetime utility, 
(3) 
where A captures the effects of discounting both through the pure rate 
of time preference and survival probabilitie~.~~  At time 0, the individual 
is endowed with some level of bequeathable wealth W,, and receives 
some annuity payment Ao. Annuity payments grow geometrically at 
the rate g; the interest rate is r. Thus, the individuals choice is con- 
strained as follows: 
(4)  1;  (C, -  A,)e-rr  dt 5  W, 
and 
W, =  e"W,  -  (C, -  d7  2  0.  (5)  I,' 
Ignoring constraint (5) and maximizing (3) subject to (4), we obtain 
the following first-order conditions: 
(6)  C,  = ey'  C, , 
where y = (r -  A)/(l  - a)  < r.36  Suppose y 2  g. Then continuing to 




Since this program never violates (9,  it is optimal. 
The interpretation of  (7) and (8) is straightforward: consumption in 
each period is a constant fraction of total wealth, and total wealth grows 
at the geometric rate y. Note, however, that the annuity wealth term, 
AJ(r - g), is equal to the simple discounted value of future benefits 
(ignoring death). Thus, to make inferences about y (the life cycle pa- 
rameter of  interest) from data on the age-wealth profiles, we should 255  Dissaving after Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis 
define total wealth to include the simple discounted value of annuities, 
not the actuarial value. Intuitively, unless an individual plans to con- 
sume his principal at some point in the future, he will be indifferent an 
annuity paying $1 per year, and an asset worth $llr (both generate the 
same survival contingent income stream). 
If y < g, the problem is more complex. Ignoring (9,  one again ob- 
tains (7) and (8), but in this case (5)  will be violated for t sufficiently 
large (the individual will wish to borrow on future annuity benefits). 
Along the true optimal program, consumption will obey the first-order 
condition (6) as long as wealth is positive; however, once (5)  binds, we 
will simply have C, = A,. Let T denote the age at which (5)  first binds. 
Then the first-order conditions imply that 
(9) 
C,  = ey'  Co 
C, = A, 
t < T 
t 2 T. 
From the resource constraint, we have 
(10)  Wo = i,'(C,  -  AJe-" dt. 
Finally, it is easy to see that, despite the binding constraint, consump- 
tion must be continuous in time, so that 
(1 1)  evT Co = egT Ao. 
Equations (9), (lo), and (11) together determine Co and T, from which 
the optimal program can be constructed. 
In Bernheim (1984b), we calculated the compensating variation as- 
sociated with the marginal annuity for the case of  y < g (using eqq. 
1914  1  1  I)  9 
where 
and established that 0 5 $ < 1. Intuitively, since (5)  may bind at some 
point, the annuity is worth less than an asset which yields the same 
yearly  survival contingent income. As  T goes to infinity (or y to g), 
this event becomes more remote, so naturally the value of annuitization 
approaches Ad(r - g). 256  B. Douglas Bernheim 
Hypothetical values  of  the proportional adjustment factor (4) are 
given in Bernheim (1984b). For completeness, we reproduce two sam- 
ple calculations  here. We  assume that r  = 0.03, g  = 0, at  = 0 (the 
logarithmic case), and A&  -  g)W, = 2 (i.e., two-thirds of total re- 
sources are held as annuities).3’ Since A depends on the rate at which 
individuals discount future utility, it is the most difficult parameter to 
gauge. We employ values of 0.05 and 0.07.38  The formula for y is given 
above. Substituting (9) into (lo), one finds that Tis given by the implicit 
solution to 
Calculated values of y, T, and 4 are presented in table 9.5. Ignoring 
nonnegativity  constraints, wealth  would decline by  2%  and  4%  per 
year, for A equal to 0.05 and 0.07, respectively. The associated uncon- 
strained intervals are 42 and 27 years. The marginal annuity is worth 
89%, and 75% of  its simple discounted value, respectively. Employing 
a “triangle approximation”  for the value of  inframarginal units, we 
find that the associated compensating variations for all annuity holdings 
are 94%, and 87% of  their simple discounted values. In contrast, for 
these parameter values the actuarial discounted value of a benefit stream 
is only 37.5% of its simple discounted value.39 
There is, of course, no reason to believe that it is appropriate to use 
the compensating variation  as a measure of annuity valuation when 
calculating wealth trajectories (except in the limiting case where the 
nonnegativity  constraints never bind).  For this reason, we pose  the 
question somewhat differently. Suppose we employ simple valuation, 
that is, define total resources, 
R, = W,  + A,/ (r -  g) , 
Table 9.5  Wealth Trajectories for Hypothetical  Parameter Values* 
Calculated 
Parameter 
Assumed Value of  X 












~  0.052 




-  0.026 
-0.093 
*For these calculations, we assumed r = 0.03, g  = 0, a = 0 (i.e., the logarithmic case), 
Ao/(r -  g)Wo = 2, and t  = 6. 257  Dissaving after Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis 
and  calculate  rates  of  dissaving from RJR,  (i.e.,  pretend  the  non- 
negativity contraints never bind). How well will our estimated dissaving 
parameter, 
yr = t-’tn(R,/R,) , 
approximate the parameter of interest (y)? 
is possible to calculate that 
W, = erf  (W, -  Ao{e(g-y)T[l - e(~-~)~l/(r  - y) 
Using our characterization of  the optimal (constrained) program, it 
- [l -  e(g-r)t]/(r  - 8)))  . 
Substituting this into the expression for R,, one can show (after some 
tedious manipulations) that 
R, 
-  = e qr[l  + $1 
Ro 
where 
Table 9.5 presents values of  Q and yr calculated for our sets of  hy- 
pothetical parameter values (where t  = 6). When A  = 0.05, + is 0.027, 
which indicates that yr understates  the  “true”  rate of  dissaving by 
approximately  1/2%  per year. Thus, rather than observing a decline of 
2% per year, we should observe “total wealth”  falling by  11/2%  per 
year. When A  = 0.07, $ = 0.090, which indicates that yr understates 
the true rate of dissaving by W2% per year. Thus, “total wealth” would 
fall by 2%%, rather than by 4%,  per year. 
These calculations suggest that yr  will, for y < g, understate the rate 
of dissaving, y. We  now prove that this inequality always holds. 
PROPOSITION  1: For y 2 g, yr = y. For y < g,  yr > y. 
Proof: The first statement follows trivially from  equation (8).  We 
prove the second claim by showing that Q > 0. Straightforward cal- 
culations reveal that, for y < g, dC,,/dA&,  < 040 (intuitively, annuities 
have a negative income effect since the nonnegativity constraint binds; 
consumption is therefore depressed). Thus, R, > Roeyf  (since the right- 
hand  side indicates remaining resources  in period  t if  nonnegativity 
constraints are ignored). Taking t  = T and rearranging, we see that 
AoenT/(r -  g) > R,  eYT. From equation (13), this is easily seen to imply 
that $ is positive. Q.E.D. 
Given this result,  one possible  approach  is  to adjust  yr given an 
assumed value of Q, corresponding to some set of reasonable parameter 
values. Unfortunately, Q  depends on y,  so we cannot estimate y from 258  B. Douglas Bernheim 
yr without knowing y  itself. Another alternative is to obtain a lower 
bound on y, in addition to this upper bound. 
How might we obtain a lower bound? One suggestion is to calculate 
rates of dissaving from W,/W, (as in the preceding section): 
ynJ  = tlen(W,/W,) . 
To  motivate  this  suggestion, ignore (for the moment)  nonnegativity 
constraints (eq. [5]).  Equation (8) will then describe the evolution of 
total wealth. Simple manipulations reveal that 
Equation (14) has an important interpretation. If the individual holds 
no  annuities,  his  bequeathable  wealth  grows at exactly the  rate y. 
Supposing as before that y < g, as annuities increase, the rate at which 
bequeathable wealth declines will a~celerate.~'  The reason is straight- 
forward: annuity wealth, A,/(r - g),  declines at the rate g; to preserve 
a total rate of decline of y, bequeathable wealth must fall at an accel- 
erated rate. Thus, as long as y < g, yw will overstate the extent of 
dissaving. Note that this is completely contrary to the assertions of 
earlier authors, who had argued that WJW,  would understate dissaving 
due to the actuarial decline in annuity wealth. 
Of  course, the  preceding  analysis ignores  the  nonnegativity  con- 
straints. It is important to verify that our lower bound  on y  is valid 
even when these constraints are considered explicitly. In particular, 
we prove: 
PROPOSITION  2: When y < g, d(W,lW,)/dA, < 0. 
Proof: Using the accounting identity 
we see that 
Appropriate substitution from equations (7) through (10) reveals that 
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where 
Using the fact that 
it is then possible to show that43 
which is the desired result. Q.E.D. 
Of course, $Ao  = 0, WJW, = y, so for y > g, A. > 0 implies yw < y. 
It is convenient to summarize this conclusion, as well as much of the 
preceding analysis, in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION  3 : 
(i)  If  y  = g or A. = 0, yr = yw = y. 
(ii)  If y > g and A. > 0, yr = y < yw. 
(iii) If  y <  g and A. > 0, yw < y < yr. 
Case iii is the most interesting, since (for g = 0) it concerns a dis- 
saver who holds positive annuities. For such an individual, depletion 
of bequeathable wealth will overstate dissaving, while depletion of total 
wealth (including the simple discounted value of annuity benefits) will 
understate it. 
Which of our two measure, yr or yw,  will be closer to y? In general, 
the answer depends upon particular parameter values. We  can obtain 
some feel for magnitudes by using (12), along with the definition of R, 
to obtain 
W,  =  eyi(l + 9) - €pi 
WO  1-5 
(15) 
where 
Suppose g = 0. What happens as f, rises? Ignoring the effect on +, we 
see that W,!  Wo  falls; in fact, it is equal to zero when ( = err(  1 + 9)  < 1. 
Thus, we would expect y'  to significantly understate y when the degree 
of annuitization is high. 
The data presented below indicate that 5 is quite high-roughly  on 
the order of 2/3 (while others have found much lower levels of  annui- 260  B. Douglas Bernheim 
tization relative to bequeathable wealth, this is due to the use of ac- 
tuarial valuation). It is therefore not very surprising that yr significantly 
outperforms yw  for our hypothetical parameter values. In table 9.5, we 
calculate values  of  yw, using equation (15). Increasing annuitization 
from zero to two-thirds of total resources accelerates the rate of  be- 
queathable wealth depletion from 2%  to 5.2%  per year for X  = 0.05, 
and from 4% to 9.3% for X  = 0.07. In both cases, the true value of y 
is much closer to our upper bound, yr. By incorporating data on an- 
nuities, we might therefore hope to learn much more about the implied 
behavioral rate of dissaving. 
9.4.2  Analysis of the Data 
In implementing the ideas described above, we encounter two con- 
ceptual difficulties. The first concerns expectations  about future an- 
nuity benefits. In particular, substantial changes in social security leg- 
islation took place during the sample period. Should we assume that 
these were properly anticipated? If we assume myopic expectations at 
each point  in time (constant real  benefits from that point  forward), 
social security wealth will be quite volatile.  However,  since by as- 
sumption this volatility is unanticipated, resulting changes in wealth 
should not be counted as saving or dissaving. In such a world, planned 
dissaving from social security is necessarily zero by definition. 
In practice, we assume that all changes in social security legislation 
during the sample period were correctly anticipated, and that constant 
real benefits were expected after 1979. This tends to minimize changes 
in social security wealth induced by legislative action. We  also assume 
that government and private pensions were expected to provide con- 
stant real and nominal benefits, re~pectively.~~ 
A second difficulty concerns the proper treatment of  couples. The 
model described above is out of its depth when household members 
can die at distinct points in time. If, however, annuities have full as- 
sumption of  benefits by  a surviving spouse, then  our conclusion is 
essentially unchanged: if  the household has no bequest motive, and if 
its members would never want to consume the principal of  an asset, 
then it must be indifferent between that asset and an annuity which 
pays the same income stream. Thus, simple discounting is still appro- 
priate. If the desire to consume the principal will arise only far in the 
future, then simple discounting must be a good approximation. 
For government and private pensions, we assume full transfer  of 
benefits, so the difficulty disappears. However, we know that this is 
counterfactual in the case of social security. We  resolve this dilemma 
by  decomposing  social  security into two streams:  a certain  stream 
(equal to the minimum benefit under any survival contingency), and a 
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simple discounting is approximately appropriate for the certain stream. 
In the following analysis, we simply ignore the contingent stream. We 
suspect that the insurance value associated with this contingent stream 
does  not  change  enough  over time  to alter any  of  our  qualitative 
conclusions. 
In table 9.6, we present calculations of annuity wealth for the samples 
described in section 9.2. The presentation of these numbers is designed 
to facilitate comparison with the results on bequeathable wealth. 
Note that between  1969 and 1975, annuity wealth rises steeply for 
most pre-retirement groups. Since pensions pay little or no income to 
such individuals during this period,  pension  assets effectively  earn 
interest as the date of benefit eligibility approaches (the rise in pension 
wealth is due solely to this effect; in these calculations, continuing to 
work does not per se contribute to the value of benefits). Note that 
this effect is not very significant for working households between 1975 
and 1979; evidently, most of these households began to receive benefits 
prior to full retirement. 
For retired groups, annuity wealth changes very little, as expected. 
During the sample period there are two countervailing effects: legis- 
lation increases the real value of social security, while inflation erodes 
the value of  private pensions. The first effect is not as large as one 
might expect, since we assume that future legislative changes are cor- 
rectly anticipated. Thus, the social security wealth stream is relatively 
flat. Since private pensions are discounted at a much higher rate, social 
security dominates these calculations.  Nevertheless, the  erosion  of 
private pension values contributes to a slight decline in total annuity 
wealth. 
In table 9.7, we combine data on bequeathable wealth and annuities. 
Due to the size of  annuities relative to bequeathable asset, the total 
wealth-age profile is relatively flat. For retired single individuals, total 
wealth appears to decline by at most  1%  per year. In fact, between 
1969 and 1975, total wealth increased for more than half of these house- 
holds.  Retired  couples exhibit a slight decline (l%lYz%  annual) in 
total  wealth  during the early  sample  period,  but  show virtually  no 
change during the later period. In contrast, working households show 
slight increases (0%2%)  in total wealth for almost every period and 
subsample. Note that the “puzzle” concerning the precipitous decline 
between 1969 and 1975 in the bequeathable wealth of late retirees now 
acquires a new interpretation: this dissaving simply offset the implicit 
saving accompanying the approach of pension eligibility. 
Contrary to King and Dicks-Mireaux, we have found that evidence 
of  rapid  dissaving among the elderly  disappears when  annuities are 
considered. Our calculations based on hypothetical parameter values 
in  a simple life cycle model (table 9.5) suggest that the data on be- Table 9.6  Changes in  Annuity Wealth  by Retirement Status 
Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired 
Variable  1969  by 1975  1975  by  1979  1969  by  1975  1975  by  1979 
Annuity wealth 
1969  75002  80049  69885  64722  105699  95429  89340  94452 
1975  73644  90580  77507  73048  100012  103500  95061  99762 
1979  -  -  77131  72974  -  -  93910  100112 
1%  A7dA69 
Mean*  -  0.0095  0.115  0.093  0.102  -  0.040  0.076  0.065  0.051 
Median  0.006  0.147  0.114  0.147  0.002  0.080  0.067  0.068 
Fraction < 0  0.311  0.032  0.019  0.023  0.442  0.090  0.141  0.164 
log AldA75 
(0.0042)  (0.0036)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Mean*  -  -  -  0.004  -0.005  -  -  -0.011  -  0.007 
Median  -  -  -0.001  -  0.001  -  -  -0.001  -0.001 
Fraction < 0  -  -  0.963  0.943  -  -  0.904  0.802 
*Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. 
(0.001)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003) Table 9.7  Changes in Total Wealth by Retirement Status 
Single Individuals  Couples 
Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired  Retired by  Not Retired 
Variable  1969  by 1975  1975  by  1979  1969  by  1975  1975  by  1979 
Total wealth 
1969  90009  110051  91600  113491  140516  162148  150643  181826 
1975  85475  117763  98108  1 10989  126906  167920  155205  175471 
1979  -  -  96340  110045  -  -  156520  183141 
~~ 
Log TWpITW,, 
Mean*  -0.067  0.061 1  0.071  -  0.021  -  0.094  0.062  0.055  0.029 
(0.027)  (0.028)  (0.052)  (0.065)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.0  19) 
Median  0.005  0.134  0.087  0.076  -  0.044  0.097  0.071  0.065 
Fraction < 0  0.450  0.228  0.237  0.337  0.624  0.302  0.328  0.370 
Log TWdTW7s 
Mean*  -  -  -  0.046  0.01 1  -  -  0.013  0.023 
(0.025)  (0.049)  (0.01  I)  (0.020) 
Median  -  -  -  0.003  0.004  -  -  0.005  0.027 
Fraction < 0  -  -  0.586  0.467  -  -  0.479  0.424 
*Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. 264  B. Douglas Bernheim 
queathable and total wealth profiles (tables 9.3 and 9.7) together are 
consistent with a behavioral dissaving rate of less than 2% per year.45 
However, as noted before, this does not constitute a formal test of the 
life cycle hypothesis. In the next section, we investigate the possibility 
of basing a formal test on information about the age-wealth profile. 
9.5  Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis 
While rates of dissaving may not, by themselves, confirm or refute 
the life cycle hypothesis, the observed response of these rates to in- 
voluntary annuitization may  provide  a basis for doing so. This sug- 
gestion motivates the following analysis. 
Returning to our formal model, let us assume that, as an approxi- 
mation, we can ignore the effect of nonnegativity constraints (eq. [51). 
Equation (14) will then describe the evolution of bequeathable wealth. 
It is useful to rewrite this as 
where 
y-g 
r-g  5(d = -  . 
Notice first that the sign of  c(g) is the same as that of  y -  g.  This 
simply reflects the phenomenon noted earlier: annuitization  will  ac- 
celerate (decelerate) the growth of  bequeathable wealth if  and only if 
y > g (y < g). We  illustrate this pattern in figure 9.1. Suppose that two 
individuals have different behavioral dissaving parameters (yl and yz), 
but that their annuity benefit profiles have a common growth rate, g. 
If  y, > g > y2, annuitization will accelerate bequeathable wealth ac- 
cumulation for individual 1, and slow it for individual 2. Proposition 2 
confirms that explicit consideration of  the  nonnegativity  constraints 
does not change this conclusion. 
A test based  on the behavioral response of  accumulation rates to 
involuntary annuitization should have substantial power against major 
alternatives. The existence of an operative bequest motive would, for 
example, imply that annuitization always causes bequeathable wealth 
to accumulate more rapidly (decline more slowly).46  A similar impli- 
cation is generated by more simple-minded models, in which house- 
holds save some constant fraction of current income. 
Next, observe that, to a first-order approximation (expanding  5 around 
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Fig. 9.1  The effect of annuitization on wealth accumulation 
The transversality condition guarantees that the coefficient of  g is un- 
ambiguously negative-in  fact, for all g < r, s’(g) < 0; 6 falls as the 
growth rate of  annuity benefits rises. Intuitively, increasing the value 
of  g may shift an individual from the regime in which annuitization 
accelerates the growth of bequeathable wealth (y > g) to the regime 
in which the effect of annuitization is reversed (y < 8). This is illus- 
trated in figure 9.1: for g’ > y,  > g, individual 1 belongs to the class 
of consumers who respond to annuitization by accumulating wealth at 
a slower rate (dashed lines indicate behavioral responses  associated 
with an annuity benefit growth rate of g’). This implication is, as well, 
presumably testable. 
Our data on bequeathable wealth profiles, of  course, only allow us 
to measure discrete changes, rather than continuous rates of change. 266  B. Douglas Bernheim 
In moving to our empirical implementation, we must therefore begin 
by converting (16) into its discrete analog: 
A, 
Wr  wt  wr+l = (1 +  y) + <(g)  -, 
For reasons discussed in section 9.3, we prefer to use the log rate of 
accumulation as our dependent variable.  Since the rate is presumed 
close to unity for most observations,  we can  employ the following 
approximation: 
Finally, using our first-order approximation of <(g)  (eq. [17]) and adding 
a stochastic error term (representing among other things, the effects 
of the preceding approximations), we produce our basic specification: 
Given  cross-sectional data on  bequeathable  wealth and annuities 
(including the growth rate of  benefits), one could estimate equation 
(18), alternatively ignoring and imposing (through a NLLS procedure) 
the implicit constraints on the coefficients. The model could then be 
tested by evaluating (statistically) the plausibility of these constraints, 
and by  examining the sign of  y -  r  in the constrained version.  We 
eschew this approach for two reasons. 
First , measurement error in  W,  introduces significant spurious cor- 
relation  between  the dependent  and independent variables.  A  more 
sophisticated estimation technique is  therefore  required.  One could 
employ a two-stage procedure, instrumenting for A/W,  with AJY,  (where 
Y, is lifetime resources). In the results reported here, we simply sub- 
stitute A,/Y, for AJW, in the basic specification. Estimates based  on 
instrumenting for A,/W, (not reported) differed very little from these 
results. 
Second, data on g is extremely poor. Inference of g from successive 
observation of  benefits received by the same individual is subject to 
enormous measurement error (due to variance in reporting). Alterna- 
tively, one might attempt to form an estimate of g based on the pro- 
portion of  benefits which are unindexed.  Presumably, this is closely 
related to the  proportion  of  benefits  received  from private  sources 
(PROP), since government pensions (including social security) are in- 
dexed, while most private pensions are not. However, the accuracy of 
this estimate would be questionable, particularly since many apparently 
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creases in benefits. Although one would nevertheless expect PROP and 
g to be negatively correlated (due to the lack of ubiquitous indexing), 
the magnitude of  this correlation is unknown. The use of  PROP to 
proxy  for g would only allow us  to judge the directions of  various 
effects, rather than their magnitudes. 
These considerations lead us to estimate the following modified ver- 
sion of equation (18):47 
A.  A. 
yi  Yi 
(19)  en W,+l,j/W,,, = po + p,  + p2  PROP,,;. 1,1 + E~.~ 
where i indexes household. Rather than attempt to recover y and Y and 
to test parameter restrictions, we simply inspect the pattern of coef- 
ficients. For a sample dominated by dissavers (savers), p1  should be 
negative  (positive).  Since PROP is negatively  correlated  with g, p2 
should be positive. We will, in addition, estimate aversion of (19) where 
en A,JYi is substituted for AJY,.  Since several levels of approximation 
have been used in deriving equation (19), we have no great attachment. 
to any particular functional relationship; it is therefore important to 
determine whether or not the signs of estimated coefficients are sen- 
sitive to such alternative specifications. 
Unfortunately, estimation of equation (19) may be contaminated by 
spurious correlation between PROP and E.  Individuals with large pri- 
vate pensions may, for example, be atypical (wealthier, less impatient). 
Alternatively, large values of PROP may reflect greater exposure to 
inflation risk, which would in turn have behavioral implications.  We 
remedy these problems  by  including PROP as a separate right-hand 
side variable in the estimating equation: 
Our expectation is that the spurious effects described above will be 
captured in the estimated value of p3:  although there are many reasons 
to believe that PROP is systematically related to E, it is much more 
difficult to explain why the partial correlation (controlling for PROP) 
between the interaction and error terms would be nonzero. 
We  estimated these specifications separately for single individuals 
and couples, using t = 1975 and t  +  1  = 1979. The second period was 
chosen so that the samples would be more representative of typical 
retirees. Results are presented in tables 9.8 and 9.9. 
Consider first the regressions for single individuals (table 9.8).  Spec- 
ification 1 corresponds to equation (19). Referring to equation (18), we 
see that the estimated intercept measures the 4-year (nonannuitized) 
dissaving rate. The particular value presented  in table 9.1 implies a 268  B. Douglas Bernheim 
Table 9.8  Single Individuals, Retired by 1975 (Dependent Variable: 
log WdW75) 
Specification 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
constant 
A/  Y 
Log AIY 
PROP 
PROP .  AIY 



























-  11.4 
(3.04) 
Table 9.9  Couples, Retired by  1975 (Dependent Variable: log W791W,s) 
Specification 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
Constant 


















-  3.55 
(1  26) 
PROP  -  -  0.403 
(0.339) 
-  13.7 
(14.3) 
PROP. AIY  -25.7 
(10.4) 




yearly dissaving rate of  about  6%,  which is on the high end  of  the 
estimates presented  in  section 9.3.  Since those estimates  were  not 
corrected  for annuities, this leads one to suspect that annuitization 
increased the rate of accumulation for this group, contrary to our the- 
oretical predictions. The point estimate of the coefficient on AIY con- 
firms this suspicion; however, it is estimated very imprecisely, and a 
range of magnitudes entirely consistent with the theory are well within 
a  single standard  deviation.  Finally,  we  see that  the  coefficient  of 
PROP.AIY is negative,  and  statistically  significant at a high  level of 269  Dissaving after Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis 
confidence. This is, of course, inconsistent with the theoretical impli- 
cations outlined above. 
Adding PROP to this regression (specification 2) changes none of the 
qualitative conclusions, and in fact increases both the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on PROP.AIY. Evi- 
dently, spurious correlation between PROP and E have the effect of 
biasing this coefficient upward. Notice also that the coefficient of PROP 
is statistically significant-its  inclusion in the regression is warranted. 
The pattern  of  estimates  using log AIY  is only  slightly different. 
Although this alternative specification obscures the interpretation of 
the intercept, the  signs of  the remaining coefficients may  again be 
revealing. As before, the separate effect of annuitization is estimated 
very imprecisely. Furthermore, when PROP is omitted (specification 
3), the estimated coefficient of  PROP.AIY is positive, though statisti- 
cally insignificant. However, the inclusion of PROP drives this coef- 
ficient significantly negative as before; furthermore, the inclusion of 
PROP seems warranted on statistical grounds (its t-statistic is approx- 
imately 4). 
We  turn now to the regressions for couples (table 9.9). The intercepts 
in specification  1 and 2 suggest a small positive saving rate, roughly 
consistent with that estimated in section 9.3. While one cannot reject 
the hypothesis that this term is negative, values lying within two stan- 
dard deviations are consistent with, at most, a dissaving rate of 2% per 
year. We  remarked earlier that couples may nevertheless have intended 
to dissave-the  observed accumulation may have been due entirely to 
unanticipated  housing price inflation during this period. If  this is so, 
annuitization should depress the rate of  accumulation for this group. 
The coefficients of AIY reveal that exactly the opposite is the case. 
While these coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels, notice that these levels are surpassed by the estimated coeffi- 
cients of log AIY in specifications 3 and 4. Together, these estimates 
strongly  suggest that  annuitization increased  accumulation rates for 
this  If so, there are two possibilities: either couples are inten- 
tional net savers after retirement (which requires us to accept somewhat 
implausible behavioral parameters to rescue the life cycle model), or 
the response among couples of saving to annuitization is inconsistent 
with life cycle motives. 
Further evidence against the life cycle hypothesis is again generated 
by  the estimated  coefficients of  PROP.AIY and  PROP.log AIY.  The 
pattern here closely resembles that for single individuals. In three of 
four specifications, the estimated parameter is negative; in two of these 
it is statistically  significant at conventional levels. Once again, only 
specification 3 yields a point estimate consistent with theory. However, 
specification 4 reveals that the omission of  PROP is unwarranted on 
statistical grounds. 270  B. Douglas Bernheim 
Although we have reported relatively few regressions in this section, 
our estimates were quite robust with respect to the inclusion of other 
potentially important variables. Adding age of respondent, health, and 
number of living children did not, for example, substantively alter any 
of the results discussed above. 
9.6  Conclusions 
If, as suggested here, the pure life cycle hypothesis fails to account 
for savings behavior after retirement, then it is important to determine 
whether this behavior is consistent with other theories. One possibility 
is to maintain life cycle motives, while posing the problem of wealth 
accumulation within a different institutional setting. In particular, the 
models of Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Bernheim et al. (1984) por- 
tray intergenerational transfers as a mechanism for facilitating intra- 
family exchange. Alternatively, one can supplement the life cycle model 
with a traditional bequest motive. Fortunately, these alternatives gen- 
erate testable empirical implications. Bernheim et al. present econo- 
metric and other evidence to support a strategic bequest motive. My 
own work in progress (preliminary results are presented in Bernheim 
[1984a]) considers whether or not the data are also consistent with a 
model  of  household  preferences  augmented  with  intergenerational 
altruism. 
Notes 
1. These tests should not be confused with those of  Feldstein (1974, 1977), 
Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Kotlikoff (1979), and others who examine the 
effect of involuntary annuitization on levels of bequeathable wealth holdings. 
2. Notice that this definition does nor include the value of durable goods. It 
is quite likely that, as a result, the data understate the true rate of dissaving 
(elderly individuals probably engage in few purchases of new durable goods, 
while old goods depreciate). The resulting bias is, however, likely to be small. 
3. Ferber et al. (1969) documents a tendency for misreporting of assets to 
be related to the respondent’s level of wealth. 
4. This can often be inferred from the corresponding completion codes, or 
from the implausibility of recorded values. 
5. Presumably, if an individual does not own a home, it is straightforward 
to report 0. 
6. Earned income does not exceed $I ,OOO  per year in any year after retirement. 
7. Note that this group is not contaminated by any households which retired 
in the interim. 
8. Aware of this difficulty, Mirer reestimates his regressions for the subsample 
of  individuals who are over 75 years old. Although this does not completely 271  Dissaving after Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle Hypothesis 
eliminate the bias (in particular, many members of this subgroup may perform 
significant part-time work), and although this subsample may be dominated by 
outliers in the age  spectrum, the robustness of Mirer’s  original estimates is 
suggestive. 
9. Lydall and Projector and Weiss simply group together all individuals over 
65. Mirer reports that 37% of his sample is between 65 and 67 years old. 
10. Estimation using the 1969 wave yielded very imprecise estimates. How- 
ever, it should be noted that the coefficient on age was slightly positive in all 
cases. 
11. Note that the samples sizes here are larger than those reported in sec. 
9.2.  Since we  employ  cross-sectional  data here,  we  do not insist  that the 
households survive to a later sample year. 
E(RIR 5  A,) = prob(R 5 A21R 5 A,) E(RIR 5  A2) 
12. Suppose Al > Az.  Then, if R is age of retirement, 
+ prob(A2 < R 5  AIIR 5  A,) E(RIA2 < R 5  A,) 
> [prob(R 
= E(RIR 5  A2). 
A21R 5 AJ + prob(A2 < RS  AllR 5 A,)] 
.  E(RJR 5 A?) 
13. To put it another way, the probability  of  living to 70 conditional upon 
surviving to 69 is higher for the average 60-year-old who actually survives to 
69  than  it  is for the average 60-year-old  in general  since the latter sample 
includes relatively unhealthy people with low conditional survival probabilities 
who are likely to die before they reach 69. 
14. The secular rise in life expectancies may partially  or completely offset 
this effect. 
15.  Mirer attempts to correct only for the “cohort  effect”  and finds, not 
surprisingly, more striking evidence of positive saving during retirement. 
16. Mirer’s procedure, in particular,  seems seriously flawed: he regresses 
the ratio of net value in owner-occupied housing to total net worth on age and 
total net worth. Elsewhere, he concedes that there is likely to be substantial 
measurement  error in net  worth. This builds  in a strong, spurious negative 
correlation between the dependent variable and observed total net worth (as 
reflected by its negative coefficient and enormous t-statistic). Presumably, all 
coefficients in this regression are then estimated inconsistently. 
17. Mirer (1979), p. 439. 
18. In the first sample year, NLS respondents are 45-59,  as opposed to 58- 
63 for the LRHS. 
19. Unfortunately,  Diamond and Hausman do not report the total number 
of individuals retiring during their sample period. Their regressions were, how- 
ever, based on approximately  1,200 observations. Assuming a uniform distri- 
bution of age, only 400 would have reached 65 by the end of the sample period. 
This  may  in part account for the large  standard error of  their  estimate. In 
contrast, the youngest LRHS respondent was 68 in 1979. 
20.  Diamond and Hausman’s sample will overrepresent early retirees. This 
may explain many of their findings; see the comments at the end of this section. 
21. Since early retirees typically are poorer and less healthy, this somewhat 
offsets the other effects. 
22. It would in any case be quite difficult to produce a “typical”  sample, 
since the LRHS oversamples certain groups to begin with. 
23. Note that for the “retired in 1969” and “not retired in 1975” samples, 
no value is reported for bequeathable wealth in 1979, since we do not require 
household survival past 1975. 272  B. Douglas Bernheim 
24. This follows from smoothing of consumption. 
25. The net worth of workers fell by 3.4% ($2,299) between 1969 and 1975, 
and rose by  11.6% ($8,771) between 197.5 and 1979. 
26. In a world without annuities, wealth would evolve in this way as long 
as preferences were homothetic. 
27. The law of large numbers requires the existence of certain moments. 
28. The assumption of independence deserves some attention. One might 
object that an individual who underreports assets in one year is likely to do 
so in the next as well. This creates no problems, as long as the fraction un- 
derreported by individual  i does not change systematically with his wealth. 
29. Observations with larger pj’s  will (given the same level of initial wealth) 
be more likely to remain in the sample. 
30. For example, over one-third of LRHS households retired in  1969 were 
single individuals: in  1975, this figure fell to one-sixth. 
31. Thomas Gustafson has pointed out that the data presented here are too 
aggregated to test this hypothesis-we  cannot tell if the same households which 
sell businesses and property also become new homeowners during this period. 
In fact, this pattern might seem somewhat unlikely, since households that do 
not own homes often have virtually no other assets. Alternatively, the rise in 
average housing wealth may be primarily attributable to the purchase of more 
expensive houses by  those liquidating business and other property holdings 
(new homeowners may have virtually  no equity). Another possibility  is that 
individuals who move at retirement typically discover that their current house 
is worth more than expected; the decline in other assets should then be counted 
as dissaving.  By disaggregating the data, it should be possible to distinguish 
between these possibilities.  This is left for future work. 
32. If the rate of time preference exceeds the discount rate, households will 
consume all resources immediately. If the inequality goes the other way, the 
transversality condition is violated, and no optimum exists. For equality, the 
household is completely indifferent  between all  consumption programs that 
exhaust his resources. 
33. See Yaari (1965). 
34. Households may still  hold  some bequeathable wealth if  annuitization 
occurs through the family, as suggested by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). It is, 
however, unclear whether one can infer anything from rates of dissaving in the 
context of their model. 
are constant over time. In such a world, the actuarial value of an annuity does 
not change with age. In what follows, it should be clear that our central results 
do not depend upon this assumption. In particular, the argument which estab- 
lishes that simple discounting is approximately appropriate depends only upon 
there being a relatively long interval before the nonnegativity constraint on 
bequeathable wealth binds. To take an extreme alternative, suppose death will 
occur at date T, with certainty. If an annuity contract promises to pay benefits 
past this date, those benefits are irrelevant. The appropriate value of an annuity 
(assuming either that the individual can borrow on benefits paid prior to T or 
that terminal benefits are not too large) is then just the simple discounted value 
of benefits, up to age T. In this very special case, actuarial valuation is exactly 
appropriate, and our technique (which includes benefits promised after ZJ  is 
clearly in error. However, we have added the qualification that there must be 
a relatively long interval before the constraint on bequeathable wealth binds. 
Here, it  binds as T, so if  T is  large, our method  is, again, approximately 
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appropriate. In general,  however,  if  there is some maximum age, one could 
always improve our measure by excluding benefits promised after the maximum 
age. 
36. The transversality condition guarantees this inequality. 
37.  This is consistent with  the calculations  in  the next  section. Previous 
studies have obtained lower estimates of  annuitization  [A,/(r - g)Wo]  specif- 
ically because they have employed actuarial valuation. 
38.  For elderly individuals,  single year  survival probabilities are approxi- 
mately 95%, so one can think of  A  = 0.05 as representing the case where all 
discounting is due to uncertain length of life. 
39.  While these calculations  appear to confirm  the  superiority  of  simple 
discounting as a measure of value, the reader should bear in mind that any 
sample of elderly individuals may exhibit great behavioral heterogeneity. Thus, 
even if  simple discounting is appropriate for the median household, it may be 
highly inaccurate when applied  to rapid  dissavers, who will  reach a binding 
constraint quickly. 
40. Details are available from the author. 
41. If  y > g, the growth of  bequeathable assets accelerates with annuitiza- 
tion. For this case, the nonnegativity constraints never bind, and (17) is exactly 
appropriate. 
42. This requires an exceptionally large amount of tedious algebraic manip- 
ulation. Details are available from the author. 
43. Again, details are available from the author. 
44. I assumed inflation rates of  6% prior to 1969, rising to 9% by  197.5, and 
12% by  1979, remaining constant thereafter. 
45. While this conclusion appears warranted  for the median household, I 
have ignored sample heterogeneity. This is particularly important, since rapid 
dissavers will reach a binding constraint on bequeathable wealth quickly, thereby 
rendering the use of simple discounting perhaps very inaccurate. Unfortunately, 
it is not possible  to distinguish behavioral heterogeneity  from measurement 
error. 
46. See Bernheim (1984a) for a discussion. 
47. Note that since PROP,,; = P,,i/Ar,i  (where P,,,  is private pension benefits), 
48. This finding is confirmed by Diamond and Hausrnan (1984). 
PROP,,; .  A,,;/Y,  = P,,JY;  (i.e., the A,,i  terms cancel). 
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Comment  Michael Hurd 
The main goals of  Bernheim’s paper are to give evidence about the 
saving behavior of the retired, to argue that  the proper measure of 
annuity wealth in an equation that describes the trajectory of wealth 
is the simple discounted value of  the annuity stream, and to test the 
pure life cycle of consumption. 1 believe that the first goal has been 
achieved  successfully: the data on saving are interesting and mostly 
convincing. The second goal has less well been achieved, but certainly 
Bernheim has made an important point with the argument. I have con- 
siderable doubts about Bernheim’s interpretation of  the results per- 
taining to the final goal; in fact, I find nothing in the overall results of 
the paper to cast doubt on the pure life cycle hypothesis. 
The saving of the elderly has been measured before; but, as Bernheim 
says in his literature review, the previous studies have flaws that make 
their interpretation difficult. In particular it is hard to believe that the 
wealth trajectories reported in those studies, most of which are based 
on cross-section data, are what the trajectories of  individuals would 
be. The data in table 9.2 on bequeathable wealth are the first convincing 
evidence I have seen about the wealth changes of elderly individuals. 
Of those data, the entries for the already retired are the only ones with 
an easy interpretation because the theory relates to the trajectory of 
lifetime wealth, which is not known for workers. Over already retired 
individuals, four wealth changes can be calculated from table 9.2: by 
marital status, wealth changes between 1969 and 1975 for those retired 
by 1969, and wealth changes between 1975 and 1979 for those retired 
.by 1975. Three changes are negative, and in some cases the decline is 
substantial. The fourth change is positive; but reference to table 9.4 
shows that the increase is due almost solely to an increase in housing 
wealth of about $2,000 per couple despite a reduction of about 2% in 
the fraction owning a home. This fact points out a difficulty in aggre- 
gating different components of wealth: a category of wealth that has a 
consumption flow and that is lumpy will certainly not change over time 
in the same way as a more liquid kind of wealth. It seems reasonable 
to suppose here that the increase in wealth was due to the large increase 
in housing values that occurred in the latter part of the decade of the 
1970s: couples were much more likely to hold a house than singles so 
they gained more than the corresponding singles category. I agree com- 
pletely with Bernheim’s statement that measures should be developed 
to reduce the importance of the very wealthy. I have reservations about 
the logarithm measure, however, because it requires observations with 
zero wealth in either the beginning or end of the period to be dropped. 
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This procedure will induce biases of an unknown magnitude and di- 
rection in the ratio of wealth. 
Overall I interpret the data of  table 9.2 to show that the wealth of 
the retired does decline as they age, and that the problems mentioned 
by Bernheim about previous studies have empirical importance. 
The changes in total wealth reported in table 9.7 are mostly a re- 
flection of the changes in bequeathable wealth because by construction 
annuity  wealth  cannot change by  much for the already  retired. The 
social security component of annuity wealth cannot change at all be- 
cause it is just the simple discounted stream of a perpetuity which 
always pays the same amount. (There is no mortality  adjustment.) 
Although the paper does not give a breakdown of  annuity wealth be- 
tween social security and private annuities, social security is probably 
almost  all of  annuity wealth.  This  is because social security is  dis- 
counted at 3% whereas private annuities are discounted at 977-  15% 
from 1969 to 1979 and at 15% after 1979. Of course, this difference in 
the discount factor makes an enormous difference in the present value 
of the constant stream. Private annuity wealth can only change between 
1969 and 1979 because the discount rate is smaller at the beginning of 
the period than at  the end. This explains why the drop in annuity wealth 
is  greater between  1969 and  1975 than between  1975 and  1979. In 
summary, little  new information about the change in  wealth  can be 
found by looking at total wealth because by construction there can be 
very little change in annuity wealth. 
The second major point of the paper is the argument  that simple, 
not actuarial, discounting is appropriate for calculating annuity wealth. 
This is potentially an important point because it will apply to studies 
of retirement behavior  as well as saving behavior. In particular,  ac- 
cording to Bernheim’s argument, any inducement to retire built into 
pension  plans  cannot arise from mortality  rates. From this point  of 
view the incentive effects of pensions reported by Wise and Kotlikoff 
in this volume are overstated. Whether simple discounting is accurate 
or not, however, depends critically on the boundary condition on be- 
queathable wealth, equation (5)  in the paper. This equation says that 
an optimal consumption plan is not allowed to drive bequeathable wealth 
negative. Whether this condition will be satisfied by a plan that ignores 
the differences between annuity wealth and bequeathable wealth de- 
pends on the initial mix of wealth, and the parameters of the problem, 
the subjective discount rate, the risk aversion parameter, the interest 
rate, and the mortality rate. Bernheim argues that, with typical values, 
the year in which bequeathable wealth will go to zero is sufficiently 
far beyond the retirement date that the boundary condition can be 
ignored, and, therefore, simple discounting is appropriate. A substan- 
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examples in table 9.5 show that the marginal trade-offs, holding utility 
constant, between bequeathable wealth and annuity wealth, calculated 
by simple discounting of the flow of annuity payments, are .89 and .75; 
that is, for a typical mix of bequeathable and annuity wealth, and typical 
parameters, an additional dollar of annuity wealth is valued somewhat, 
although  not  greatly, less than  an additional dollar of  bequeathable 
wealth. This conclusion depends on the parameter values used to cal- 
culate the time until the boundary condition holds, and to calculate the 
trade-off. Bernheim used some typical parameter values to conclude 
that  simple discounting  is appropriate.  Other,  seemingly reasonable 
parameter values, however, do not lead to the same conclusion. For 
example, I used a risk aversion parameter of  -2,  an interest rate of 
.03, a subjective rate of time discount of  .05, and a constant mortality 
rate of .04 to calculate roughly that an average single person who retired 
in  1969 would have exhausted bequeathable wealth in about 15 years 
under the consumption plan that ignores the boundary condition, and 
that the trade-off between the two kinds of wealth is about .4. Whether 
these calculations are strictly accurate or not, or whether the param- 
eters are typical or not, the calculations show that there are surely a 
number  of  observations in the data for which the time period  until 
bequeathable wealth is exhausted is short and the marginal valuation 
is not near unity. As Bernheim points out, however, this calculation of 
the marginal valuation of annuity wealth is irrelevant to the central 
question of  the paper: What do the rates of asset decumulation tell us 
about utility function parameters? Because a central point of the paper 
is that simple discounting of annuities is the appropriate way to value 
them, he puts the question somewhat differently: What can the rate of 
decumulation of total wealth (calculated from simple discounting) tell 
us about a key utility function parameter? He shows that the observed 
rates of decumulation will equal the parameter  of interest, which is 
negative in most cases, plus a positive number. In table 9.5, he gives 
two examples. In the first, the time until bequeathable wealth is ex- 
hausted,  T, is 42 years. The true parameter is  -.02  and the error is 
.005; that  is, we would observe decumulation of  ,015 per year and 
interpret that to be the utility parameter  (actually a combination  of 
several parameters). We, therefore, make a 25% error in the parameter 
calculation. In the second example, T is 27 years, the true parameter 
is -  .04, and the error is .015. We  make a 30% error in the parameter 
estimate. What the error would be for my illustrative example, which 
has a T of  15, is unknown, but it undoubtedly would be greater than 
when T = 27. Again there are surely a number of observations in the 
data for which T is small and the error substantial. Even if  T is large 
for average values of the parameters and wealth mix, which is by no 
means obvious because we do not know what average values of the 278  B. Douglas Bernheim 
parameters are, there is a serious aggregation problem. For many kinds 
of problems it is not enough to say that the typical or average obser- 
vation in the data implies that simple discounting is justified: the ag- 
gregation problem requires that each case be examined. Unfortunately 
this creates substantial computation problems because usually one de- 
sires to estimate the utility function parameters, yet they must be known 
to decide whether simple discounting is appropriate or not. In summary, 
Bernheim has made a useful point; whether the conclusion should be 
applied in a particular study depends on the details of the study. It is 
certain, however, that estimation which makes use of annuity data will 
be much more complicated. 
The third goal of the paper is to test the pure life cycle hypothesis 
of  consumption. The idea behind the test is that people with a high 
ratio of pension wealth to bequeathable wealth will consume at a dif- 
ferent rate than people with a low ratio. This kind of  relationship is 
not easy to estimate, however. First, bequeathable wealth is not really 
exogenous: for example, if people have different rates of  time prefer- 
ence both the trajectory of  wealth and wealth will be a reflection of 
the rate of  time preference.  Second, the wealth trajectories are valid 
for steady states; but there were surely a number of unexpected shocks 
during the 1970s that affected wealth trajectories. Inflation and social 
security changes are examples. Third, the equation to test the hypoth- 
esis, equation (14), has an unobserved  variable, the growth rate of 
pensions, that appears on the right-hand side. Bernheim solves this last 
problem by substituting for the growth rate, the ratio of annuity benefits 
from private sources to total annuity benefits. It is expected that if  the 
model is correct and the life cycle hypothesis is valid the coefficient 
on this variable will be positive. According to the results in tables 9.8 
and 9.9, however, that coefficient is generally negative. Bernheim in- 
terprets this to be good evidence against the life cycle hypothesis. I 
believe this  strong conclusion  is not  warranted. As was mentioned 
earlier, the basic equation (14) refers to a steady state; yet the rate of 
inflation increased substantially over the time period of the data. The 
jump in inflation caused notjust a decline in the growth rates of pensions 
but also a loss of wealth. The wealth loss was greatest for people who 
had a large value of  private pension wealth. What effect this had on 
the estimated coefficients is not clear because several of the right-hand 
variables  were  affected; but  in  that  there was  a differential impact 
according to the value of a key right-hand variable, one would want 
to be cautious in the interpretation of the results. In a similar way there 
were windfall gains in social security that affected the sample differ- 
entially according to the ratio of private annuity benefits to social se- 
curity benefits. 
In summary, this paper presents some interesting data on the wealth 
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the elderly do not continue to save after retirement, and, therefore the 
claims made in some of the older literature are incorrect. The paper 
makes an important point about the computation of annuity wealth: 
depending on the application  it may  often be  the case that  annuity 
wealth should be the simple discounted flow of annuity payments. This 
point will have relevance in many other kinds of problems. Despite the 
test of  the pure life cycle hypothesis, my general impression is that 
there is little evidence against the life cycle hypothesis here; rather, I 
view the wealth trajectories as providing support for the hypothesis. This Page Intentionally Left Blank